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This study uses a bootstrap methodology to explicitly distinguish between skill and luck for 
80 Real Estate Investment Trust Mutual Funds in the period January 1995 to May 2008. The 
methodology successfully captures non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds. Using 
unconditional,  beta  conditional  and  alpha-beta  conditional  estimation  models,  the  results 
indicate that all but one fund demonstrates poor skill. Tests of robustness show that this 








Separating Skill from Luck in REIT Mutual Funds 
 
1. Introduction 
The last two decades have seen a substantial increase in the extent of institutional investment 
in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) sector. Prior to the onset of what is often referred 
to as the modern REIT era in 1992, average institutional ownership was only 14% (Chan et 
al., 2003), yet increased to over 60% by 2005 (Lin et al., 2009). The impact of this increase 
has been directly or indirectly examined in a large volume of research in recent years and has 
been shown to have contributed to factors such as the increase in the number of analysts 
covering the sector (Wang et al., 1995), the reduction in spreads (Below, et al., 1996 and 
Bhasin et al., 1997), flow of funds affects resulting from increased institutional investment 
(Downs,  1998)  and  the  impact  on  volume  and  volatility  (Cotter  &  Stevenson,  2008  and 
Jirasakuldech et al., 2009). This is in addition to the large literature that has considered the 
altering dynamics in the sectors investment characteristics, in particular, its relationship with 
mainstream stocks (e.g. Glascock et al., 2000, Clayton & MacKinnon, 2001 and Case et al., 
2010)  and  the  nature  of REIT  systematic risk  (e.g.  Crain et al., 2000,  Feng  et  al,  2006, 
Ambrose et al., 2007). 
 
In addition, the last twenty years have also seen a large degree of growth in the number of 
dedicated REIT mutual funds. As Hartzell et al. (2010) note, the number of dedicated funds 
increased from 16 in the early nineties to 132 unique funds by 2005, while fund ownership as 
a percentage of the sector‟s market capitalization increased from under 2% in 1992 (Ling & 
Naranjo, 2006) to over 14% by 2005 (Hartzell et al., 2010). While a growing literature has 
considered the performance of Real Estate Mutual Funds (REMFs), the majority have tended 
to apply conventional performance measurement tools. Like all investment funds REMFs are 
largely  judged  upon  their  performance  history,  with  Jensen‟s  Alpha  being  one  of  main 
measures of fund performance used. Of the 64 active US REMFs listed on MorningStar.com 
in mid-2008 the trailing average alpha over 3-years is 0.125% with 33 achieving positive 
alpha. These results would imply that on average REMF managers out-perform and create 
investor value, while some managers have exceptional skill. However, alpha in its traditional 
form  does  not  delineate  between  skill  and  luck.  This  separation  of  performance  is  of 
importance as it is likely that at least some of the funds perform very well, or indeed badly, 
not due to the relative skill of the manager but due to luck.  
 
In contrast to previous studies of REMF performance, this paper applies a methodological 
approach  that  explicitly  distinguishes  between  the  skill  and  luck  of  a  fund  manager.  It    
 
 
examines the issue using a cross-sectional bootstrap methodology similar to that used by 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008). While previous studies of REMFs have provided mixed evidence 
with respect to whether the average REMF outperforms, they have all assessed performance 
on an aggregate basis using standard test statistics. This approach implicitly assumes that a 
funds idiosyncratic risk has a known parametric distribution, namely normal. However, it is 
shown that many funds, especially those in the extreme tails of the performance distribution, 
are likely to exhibit non-normality in their idiosyncratic risk. These are precisely the funds 
that potential investors will be most interested in identifying: extreme winners to invest in and 
extreme  losers  to  avoid.  In  addition,  where  non-normality  is  present  standard  asymptotic 
results do not apply and test statistics based on standard critical values, as used in the existing 
literature, may give misleading inferences. The cross-sectional bootstrap methodology used in 
this study allows for the separation of skill and luck in the performance of individual funds, 
even when idiosyncratic risk is highly non-normal, as in the extreme tails of the distribution.  
 
The results show that in the majority of cases not only do REMFs underperform in terms of 
displaying stock selection ability, but that this underperformance is significantly worse than 
that  which  could  be  attributed  to  luck  alone.  These  findings  are  also  consistent  across 
different sub-samples. The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The following section 
briefly  reviews  the  existing  work  on  dedicated  REIT  funds.  Section  3  considers  the 
methodological framework adopted in the current study, while the following section details 
the data used in the paper and the performance evaluation models tested. Section 5 discusses 
the empirical findings, while Section 6 provides concluding comments. 
 
2. Previous Studies on Real Estate Mutual Fund Performance 
Previous  studies  of  REMF  performance  have  tended  to  apply  conventional  performance 
measurement tools. However, one of the key differences in the results centers around the 
sample period examined. Whereas earlier studies (e.g., Kallberg et al, 2000 and Gallo et al., 
2000) largely found evidence of outperformance by fund managers, more recent studies have 
largely reported a lack of significant performance. Kallberg et al. (2000) is one of the earliest 
comprehensive examinations of REMFs. Using a sample of 44 funds, from a period covering 
1986  through  1998,  they  find  active  management  can  add  value,  reporting  significantly 
positive alphas. These results are also broadly consistent irrespective of whether single index 
or  multi-factor  models  are  used,  whether  the  alphas  are  allowed  to  be  time  varying  and 
whichever benchmark index was used. For example, using a standard single-index model they 
find that the average alpha is 0.068 when compared to the NAREIT index of publicly traded 
REITs. The average alpha remains significant and highly positive when the real estate index 
used is the Wilshire Real Estate Index (17.3%) or the Wilshire REIT index (6.5%). Only    
 
 
when a multi-factor model is used, that includes the S&P 500, risk-premiums for size and 
growth and bond excess returns, does the average figure fail to be significantly positive. Of 
further interest is that these figures are substantially higher than those found in most studies 
of  general  equity  mutual  fund,  which  generally  have  reported  negative  average  alphas. 
Kallberg et al. (2000) however recognise that intercepts can capture the effects of model 
misspecification and run a cross-sectional regression of the reported alphas against reasonable 
determinants of performance (such as fund size and expense ratio) to ascertain whether they 
are actually capturing excess returns. They find that total assets and turnover are significant 
determinants  of  alpha  but  that  a  dummy  for  passive  style  (versus  active)  is  negatively 
correlated and significant. They therefore attribute some of the apparent out-performance to 
active style, which can be viewed as a proxy for skill. 
 
Gallo et al. (2000) also measure alpha, for a sample of 24 REMFs between 1991 and 1997, 
using  single  and  multi-index  models.  They  find  the  sampled  funds  outperformed  by  an 
average 5.3% when compared to the Wiltshire Real Estate Index (single-index model). Using 
Sharpe‟s (1992) effective-mix test they find that the superior performance is largely due to 
overweighting in out-performing property types relative to the Wilshire Real Estate Index, 
specifically apartments and healthcare, the latter being excluded from the index completely. 
They find 94% of performance is attributable to allocation by property sector, whilst they 
infer just 6% is due to allocation to other asset classes and stock-selection within property 
sectors. They therefore distinguish between macro forecasting (sector-picking) and micro-
forecasting (stock-picking) and conclude that the majority of forecasting performance is due 
to macro-level decisions.  
 
Whilst  Kallberg  et  al.  (2000)  and  Gallo  et  al.  (2000)  reported  supportive  evidence  with 
respect to the performance of REMFs, more contemporary studies have found little or no 
evidence of out-performance. Studies such as O‟Neal & Page (2000), Lin & Yung (2004), 
Rodriguez (2007) and Chiang et al. (2008) all fail to identify any evidence of significant 
outperformance. The recent paper by Hartzell et al. (2010) extends the analysis conducted in 
previous  work  in  a  number  of  ways,  specifically  in  terms  of  model  specifications  and 
benchmarks. The alternative benchmarks used adapt conventional ones in the following form. 
Initially, three and four-factor models based on those proposed by Fama & French (1993) and 
Cahart (1997) are used incorporating size, book-to-market and momentum factors. However, 
a  key  difference  in  the  Hartzell  et  al.  (2010)  paper  is  that  the  portfolios  used  in  the 
construction  of  the  factors  are  purely  based  on  REITs  not  stocks  overall.  Secondly,  the 
authors use returns of portfolios sorted by the property type and finally, a combination of the 
above two approaches is used, incorporating size, book-to-market and property type. While    
 
 
the primary results concur with other recent work in finding a lack of evidence in favour of 
outperformance, Hartzell et al. (2010) find that outperformance can be achieved with respect 
to the primary benchmark indices (e.g. FTSE-NAREIT and Dow Jones Wilshire) by tilting 
the REMF portfolio towards small cap REITs, including non-REIT securities such as Real 
Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) and by adopting a momentum strategy.  
 
The issue relating to the benchmarks is important in a REIT context and the results of Hartzell 
et al. (2010) in this respect do effectively capture the fact that the primary benchmark indices 
are not only constrained to REITs, therefore excluding firms such as REOCs, but are also 
heavily weighted in large cap REITs by definition as they are value weighted. The FTSE 
NAREIT indices includes all US listed REITs with a market capitalisation above $100m, 
while the cut-off for the Dow Jones Wilshire REIT index is $200m. Furthermore, irrespective 
of  these  explicit  constraints,  the  fact  is  that  the  REIT  sector  is  characterised  as  being 
dominated on a market capitalization basis, by a small number of firms. The results also show 
how controlling for non-REIT investment (e.g. REOC) is important. The incorporation of 
non-REITs sees an increase in the R-squared‟s reported by Hartzell et al. (2010), particularly 
in the case of the single-index models, and results in a reduction in the estimated abnormal 
performance. While size effects and momentum also provide valuable insights, the property 
type factors explain less of the cross-sectional variation. Furthermore, Hartzell et al. (2010) 
find  that  there  is  a  low  correlation  between  alphas  highlighting  the  issue  of  benchmark 
selection. 
 
With respect to the momentum issue, not only is this consistent with the broader mutual fund 
literature (Cahart, 1997), but in addition, there is a large degree of evidence relating to the 
REIT  sector.  Ling  &  Naranjo  (2006)  find  evidence  of  REIT  performance  significantly 
impacting  upon  future  capital  flows,  a  finding  that  would  also  be  supportive  of  the 
momentum profits observed in REIT studies such as Chui et al. (2003) and Hung & Glascock 
(2008, 2010). A recent study by Derwell et al. (2009) explicitly considers momentum profits 
in the context of REMFs. The effect of incorporating a REIT specific momentum factor is a 
reduction  of  the  positive  alpha‟s  previously  reported.  However,  the  interpretation  of  the 
results  does  have  to  be  addressed  carefully.  While  Derwell  et  al.  (2009)  argue  that  the 
findings indicate that previously reported performance studies of REMF‟s may have over-
estimated the extent of managerial skill, it should however be noted that while the inclusion 
of a momentum factor has been clearly illustrated of being of importance in explaining fund 
performance,  it  can  argued  that  perhaps  this  is  actually  a  key  component  of  active 
management and what a manager is being remunerated for.     
 
 
3. Bootstrapped Methodological Framework 
Assuming that if all fund managers have no skill, the „true‟ alpha of each fund can be seen as 
being  normally  distributed,  with  a  mean  of  zero  and  a  known  standard  deviation,  which 
differs for each fund. This standard deviation is what we refer to as the „luck‟ distribution. We 
can order the best ex-post performing fund, on the basis of alpha, as number one. If however, 
we impose an alpha of zero then it is likely that we would sample a different estimate of alpha 
due to this distribution of luck. While the most likely re-sampled alpha is zero, we may 
sample a value at the extreme of the distribution and that the funds ranking is no longer first. 
The same applies for each fund in the sample. Overall, the greater the variance of the „luck‟ 
distributions of alpha, the more likely the funds are to be re-ordered. This becomes especially 
relevant when performance distributions are idiosyncratic and non-normal. By re-sampling 
once, with   = 0 for all i funds by using the residuals, we have i alphas, which can be ordered. 
By repeatedly re-sampling n times and choosing the highest alpha each time we can obtain 
the complete distribution of alpha under the null hypothesis of no out-performance for the 
best-performing fund. This is simply the „luck‟ distribution for the best performing fund. 
Similarly, this can be obtained for the second best performing fund by choosing the second 
highest value of alpha sampled in each of the n samples and so on.  
 
This is the methodological approach taken here, specifically using residual only re-sampling. 
This is achieved as follows. Firstly, we estimate the factor model in question for the fund. 
From the residuals from this estimation we draw a random sample, with replacement. Re-
sampling is of length T, where T is the number of observations for the fund. These re-sampled 
bootstrap residuals are then used to generate a simulated excess return series for the fund in 
question,  under  the  null-hypothesis  of  no  abnormal  performance  (   =  0),  with  the 
chronological ordering of the factor returns unaltered. Based on the simulated returns series, 
the factor model is estimated and the first bootstrapped estimates of alpha obtained. This 
process is then repeated for all i funds and the alpha‟s ordered. This process is repeated 1,000 
times in order to generate the „luck‟ distributions for each ordered fund as explained above.  
 
We can therefore compare the ex-post value of alpha for each fund with its concomitant luck 
distribution. If the ex-post alpha is higher than (say) the 1% right tail cut-off point then we 
can reject the null hypothesis of no out-performance with 99% confidence and reasonably 
conclude that the excess return of the fund is due to skill. This approach has the advantage 
that each „luck‟ distribution contains information about the „luck‟ experienced by all funds 
and not just that of the fund in question, as the re-sampled alphas are ordered each time.  
    
 
 
Three recent papers have considered the issue of mutual fund performance in terms of the 
skill present. Kosowski et al. (2006) examine 1,704 US mutual funds between 1975 and 2002. 
They find the proportion of funds with genuine skill is between 30-40% for the period 1975 to 
1989, although it falls to 5% for 1990 to 2002. Cuthbertson at al. (2008) apply the bootstrap 
methodology utilised in the current paper to a sample of 842 UK equity funds from 1975 
through 2002, finding that 12 of the top 20 funds have genuine skill but that below the top 3% 
of funds any out-performance is due to luck. They also find that the „genuine‟ out-performers 
are not necessarily those producing the best ex-post alphas. This highlights the difficultly in 
using conventional measures in identifying skilful managers in relation to poor performance, 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find evidence of value-destruction due to „poor skill‟, rather than 
simply bad luck, for between 20-40% of those funds with negative alphas. The key difference 
between the approach adopted in Kosowski et al. (2006) and that proposed by Cuthbertson et 
al. (2008) and also followed here is that Kosowski et al. (2006) apply the bootstrap approach 
on  a  fund-by-fund  basis.  This  therefore  accounts  only  for  the  luck  experienced  by  each 
respective fund in isolation as the bootstrapped alphas are not reordered.  Fama & French 
(2009) adopt a slightly bootstrapping approach. They simulate the cross-sectional   estimates. 
This is achieved by initially setting   to zero by subtracting the   estimate from the fund‟s 
monthly return. The primary difference in the two approaches is that the Fama & French 
(2009) captures the cross-correlation of the returns of the funds as the same sample period is 
used for each fund and that they effectively jointly sample fund returns and the explanatory 
returns. In contrast, the Kosowski et al. (2006) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008) approach ensures 




One further issue does warrant note is that Kosowski et al (2006) and Fama & French (2009) 
both provide evidence that value/income fund managers were less likely to provide skill. 
Kosowski et al. (2006) for example, find that the top-performing funds are generally growth 
rather  than  income  funds
2.  This  may  therefore  beg  the  question  as  to  why  consider  the 
performance of REMFs, which virtually by definition are income/value funds. There are two 
reasons for this. One is that Cuthbertson et al. (2008) found that in their sample of UK fund 
managers skill tended to be demonstrated mostly by income rather than growth funds. The 
second is concerned with the increased size of the REMG sector over the last two decades. 
This  together  with  the  changing  dynamics  of  the  underlying  REIT  market  may  lead  to 
differentiated findings.  
    
 
 
4. Data and Model Selection 
The data set used in this paper consists of monthly returns for 80 REMFs for the sample 
period January 1995 through May 2008. The data consists of 64 active and 16 dead funds, 
thus survivorship bias is eliminated. The criterion for inclusion in the sample was a minimum 
of 15 monthly observations. Where a fund offers multiple share classes, only the single fund 
with the lowest expense ratio was included. This decision was made as the study is concerned 
with management performance rather than investor returns per se and that the funds with 
lower charges exhibit returns closer to raw performance. Share classes were therefore selected 
in the following order, depending on availability: Institutional (Class I/Y, which offer lower 
fees because of the larger minimum investment required); Class-A (charge a front-end load 
with a lower annual management charge than Classes B and C); Class-B (charge a redemption 
fee on sale); Class C (don‟t charge a front-end load or redemption fee and concomitantly 
charge higher annual fees). A few funds also offer a Class Z share, for employees of the firm, 
and this was chosen when it had the lowest expense ratio.  
 
To allow for more accurate factor model estimation in the calculation of the alphas, only 
funds investing a minimum of 80% of assets in publicly listed US real estate firms were 
included. This focuses the study on the performance of US REMFs, which have a  more 
established  history,  and  avoids  applying  diverse  international  benchmarks  to  disparate 
REMFs, which it was felt would lack precision. Tracker funds were also eliminated as the 
study  is  concerned  with  stock-selection  ability.  Of  the  119  currently  active  REMFs 
recognised by Morningstar, 42 invest globally; 3 are trackers; 9 had insufficient data available 
and one, the Pimco Real Estate Real Return Fund, holds a significant proportion of non-real 
estate  assets  (Treasuries).  Of  the  23  dead  REMFs  in  existence  during  the  period  under 
consideration and where data was available, 3 invested globally, 2 were trackers and 2 had 
insufficient data available for inclusion. Returns were calculated from bid price to bid price, 
with income from dividends reinvested. The returns are therefore gross of taxes on dividends 
and capital gains tax on growth, and net of management fees
3. 
 
For model selection, monthly total returns are used for all factors. The market factors tested 
are the FTSE NAREIT US Real Estate Index; the FTSE NAREIT US REIT Index and the 
Dow  Jones  Wilshire  REIT  index.  The  factor  representing  the  size  effect,  SMB,  is  the 
difference between the returns of the Dow Jones Wilshire Large-Cap and Small-Cap indices
4. 
The factor representing the premium for value stocks, HML, is the difference between the 
returns of the Dow Jones Wilshire Mid-Cap Value and Mid-Cap Growth indices. The risk-
free rate used to calculate excess returns is the one-month return of the Merrill Lynch 3 
Month US T-Bills index. The variables used in the conditional models for the lagged public    
 
 
information variable, zt, are the dividend yield on the S&P500 index and the one-month risk-
free rate as above. Descriptive statistics for the sample funds and indexes are presented in the 
appendix. Of note is that the Sharpe Ratios shows that, on average, the funds underperformed 
the benchmarks by a significant margin during the sample period. The mean Sharpe Ratio of 
the  80  REMFs  was  0.10 compared  to  0.29  for  the Wilshire  All  REITs  index,  indicating 
inferior risk-adjusted performance compared to a relevant benchmark. 
 
The paper initially compares a number of alternative models in the estimation of alpha. The 
primary  results  are  best  on  a  single  model,  with  the  selection  based  on  the  Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC) and the statistical significance of the constituent parameters to 
determine a „best-fit‟ model for each of three classes of model outlined below. The first form 
of model used is the traditional unconditional model, with time-invariant alphas and betas. 
The standard single-index version of Jensen (1968) can be displayed as follows: 
 
Rit – Rft =  i + ßi (Rmt – Rft) +  it               (1) 
Where Rit is the return on fund i in period t. 
Rft is the risk-free rate (30-day Treasury Bill in period t). 
Rmt is the single-index return on the relevant benchmark index. 
 
The multi-factor version, as adapted from Fama & French (1993) can be shown as: 
 
Rit – Rft =  i + ßi (Rmt – Rft) + ßsi (Rst – Rlt) + ßgi(Rgt – Rvt) +  it        (2) 
Where Rmt here is the return on the benchmark.  
Rst – Rlt is the difference between small and large-cap returns.  
Rgt – Rvt is the difference between growth and value returns.  
 
In  additional  to  the  conventional  form  of  performance  evaluation  models  conditional 
specifications are also used in the form proposed by Ferson & Schadt (1996). Conditional 
models control for look-ahead bias as a fund‟s factor betas may be dependent on lagged 
public information variables (zt). Betas may therefore be time variant due to changes in this 
information set (such as changes in company dividend policy) or because managers alter 
portfolio weights depending on this lagged information and so alter their beta. In the case of 
the single-index model the conditional specification can be expressed as:  
 
Rit – Rft =  i + ß0i (Rmt – Rft) + ßzi-1 [zt-1 * (Rmt – Rft)] +  it         (3) 
    
 
 
The  next  form  of  model  specification  considered  is  the  conditional  alpha-beta  model 
(Christopherson et al., 1998), which allows for alpha to also depend linearly on the lagged 
public information set z: 
 
Rit – Rft =  0i +  zi-1 (zt-1) + ß0i (Rmt – Rft) + ßzi-1 [zt-1 * (Rmt – Rft)] +  it      (4) 
 
This can be similarly generalised to a multi-factor model. The variables used for zt here are 
the one-month T-Bill yield and the S&P500 dividend yield.  
 
The above models assume that returns are of a linear functional form, however market timing 
models account for the fact that when managers expect the market to go up they may increase 
their factor beta accordingly in order to gain expose to upside volatility thus leading to the 
returns being of a quadratic functional form. In other words, successful market timing is 
doubly rewarded as the sectors they overweight in become even more significantly weighted 
in their portfolio as prices rise. The two main specifications of the model examined are that of 
Treynor & Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson & Merton (1981). The Treynor & Mazuy (1966) 
model can be specified as: 
 
Rit – Rft =  i + ßi (Rmt – Rft) +  im [Rmt – Rft]
2 +  it           (5) 
 
Where  im  >  0  =  the  unconditional  measure  of  market  timing  ability.  The  Henriksson & 
Merton (1981) market timing model can be shown as follows: 
 
Rit – Rft =  i + ßi (Rmt – Rft) +  im [Rmt – Rft]
+ +  it            (6) 
 
Where [Rmt – Rft]
+ = max {0, Rmt – Rft}. 
 
These models can be generalised to conditional models. If managers do have the ability to 
time the market then a linear model biases alpha upwards, as it exaggerates the skill or luck in 
sector-weighting. Controlling for market timing focuses alpha as a measure of stock selection, 
rather than sector weighting, thus making the measurement more robust. 
 
The models were then estimated for all 80 funds and the cross-sectional average statistics 
calculated. Model selection was based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), which 
measures the efficiency of a parameterised model in predicting the dependent variable, while    
 
 
imposing a penalty for complexity (additional variables). SIC is an increasing function of the 
number of parameters and a decreasing function of the residual sum of squares and so it is 
desirable to minimise SIC. Exhibit 1 presents the cross-sectional results for the single-factor 
unconditional model using all three indices examined; NAREIT Real Estate; NAREIT REITs 
and Wilshire REITs. The Wilshire REIT index, which excludes smaller securities included by 
NAREIT, was found to have the best explanatory power (Lowest SIC and Adjusted R
2 of 
0.71). This suggests that REMFs tend to invest in larger, more liquid real estate securities, 
which an examination of their holdings supports. Exhibit 1 also presents results for the other 
models examined, using the Wilshire REIT index as the market factor. The results reported 
here are for models using the S&P500 dividend yield as the conditional variable and the 
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) market timing factor, which were consistently found to be statistically 
more significant than their alternatives. The highlighted models indicate the best in the i) 
unconditional, ii) conditional beta and iii) conditional alpha-beta classes.  
 
Fama and French premiums for small-cap and value stocks did not provide more efficient 
model estimation than the single-index model in any class. This is perhaps unsurprising as 
most US REITs tend to be small to medium in size relative to other equities and because 
REIT cash flows are derived from stable rental income, they tend to be value-type stocks. 
Market timing factors were also not significant in either the Treynor-Mazuy nor Henriksson-
Merton specifications. This makes intuitive sense as evidence has shown the REIT market to 
be increasingly homogenous across sectors (e.g. Chong et al., 2010)
5. While early studies of 
REMF performance use multi-factor models, they do not use SIC to determine the efficiency 
of estimation, which it is felt is the most robust specification criterion. 
 
Exhibit 2 presents the cross-sectional estimation results for the three best-fit models. Around 
85%  of  funds  have  non-normal  errors,  using  the  Jarque-Bera  statistic,  highlighting  the 
limitation  of  traditional  asymptotic  test  statistics.  As  noted  in  the  introduction  standard 
performance  test  statistics  implicitly  assume  that  a  funds  idiosyncratic  risk  has  a  known 
normal parametric distribution. Non-normality leads to a position whereby test statistics based 
on standard critical values may lead to misleading inferences. In addition, it is also those 
funds that display non-normality in their idiosyncratic risk that investors will wish to identify. 
Furthermore, the proportion of funds with non-normal errors is higher than that reported in 
either the Kosowski et al. (2005) or Cuthbertson et al. (2008) papers, who reported figures of 
48%  and  64%  respectively.  This  therefore  provides  additional  rationale  as  to  the 
methodological  approach  adopted  in  the  current  study.  The  Adjusted  R
2  across  all  three 
models  is  around  0.70,  which  suggests  that  the  factor  models  reasonably  explain  fund 
performance. As the SIC is lowest for the unconditional model, there is little support for the    
 
 
use of a conditional framework. The unconditional single-index model is therefore used as the 
„baseline‟ model for later tests of robustness
6.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
Exhibit 3 presents the ex-post alphas for the 80 REMFs using each class of model. In all three 
best-fit  models,  the  cross-sectional  average  alpha  takes  on  a  negative  and  statistically 
insignificant value: -0.55% per month (-6.8% annually) for the unconditional model; -0.54% 
per month (-6.7% per annum) for the conditional beta model and -0.57% (-7.1% per annum) 
for the conditional alpha beta model. Using the unconditional model, only 5 of the 80 funds 
(6%) deliver abnormal return; using the conditional beta model 7 funds (9%) created value 
and using the conditional alpha-beta model 9 (11%) deliver alpha. This is consistent with 
other studies of US Mutual Funds such as Blake & Timmermann (1998), although it contrasts 
with earlier studies of REMFs such as Kallberg et al. (2000) and Gallo et al. (2000), who both 
find  positive  cross-sectional  average  alpha  using  a  single-index  model.  It  should  be 
remembered that if a fund simply matches the benchmark performance, it would be expected 
that a small negative alpha would be observed due to transaction costs and management fees. 
However, the magnitude of average under-performance reported here is relatively large and 




Of particular interest in the context of this study is the relatively large cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the alpha estimates: 0.38% per month for the unconditional model; 0.39% for the 
conditional beta model and 0.69% for the conditional alpha-beta model. This suggests that 
there may be a significant number of funds in the extreme tails of the distribution of abnormal 
return. Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 show histograms of the cross-sectional distribution of the alpha 
estimates for all funds from the three models. There is a wide spread of estimates and a 
significant number of funds in both tails of the distribution for all three models. 
 
Exhibit 7 presents the summary bootstrap results for the unconditional (Panel A), conditional 
beta (Panel B) and conditional alpha-beta (Panel C) models. The first row in each panel 





th percentiles. The second row shows the bootstrap p-values based on the luck 
distribution  for  alpha  (under  the  null  of  no  out-performance).  The  third  row  offers 
interpretation, indicating whether that fund‟s ex-post alpha demonstrates skill or luck at the 
1% significance level – i.e. whether it is in the extreme tail of the luck distribution. It also 
states whether this is due to good or poor skill/luck – i.e. whether the ex-post alpha is in the 
left (poor) or right (good) tail. For example, if we take the worst performing fund (ex-post)    
 
 
using the unconditional model, we see it has an ex-post alpha of -2.51% per month. The p-
value of 0.005 indicates that it is in the extreme tail of the luck distribution – i.e. its alpha is 
genuinely due to management ability, as opposed to luck. The fact that row 3 indicates this is 
due  to  good  skill  means  that  the  ex-post  alpha  is  in  the  extreme  right  tail  of  the  luck 
distribution for the worst performing fund. By way of illustration, Exhibit 8 illustrates the 
location of the best performing fund‟s ex-post alpha within its luck distribution. Although it 
has an actual ex-post alpha of 0.99%, it can be seen to be in the extreme left tail of its 
distribution of luck – and therefore indicative of poor skill rather than simply luck. 
 
In the period January 1995 to May 2008, all but one of the 80 sampled REMFs were found to 
have an ex-post alpha due to poor skill. In other words, all but one fund‟s ex-post alpha was 
in the extreme left tail of the luck distribution of alpha meaning they all underperformed 
relative to how they would be expected to simply due to luck. The one fund that behaved 
counter to this was in fact the worst performing fund, which, as outlined above, was found to 
have  produced  a  negative  alpha  due  to  „good  skill‟.  Although,  counter-intuitive  to  label 
under-performance „skilful‟ it is simply to say this fund did not perform as badly as we would 
expect it to given the distribution of luck. The results are also consistent across all three 
classes of model.  
 
The use of the non-parametric bootstrap is motivated by the idea that extreme performers are 
likely to exhibit non-normal risk and therefore will change position more frequently than 
median performers. This is supported by the estimation output as the distribution of extreme 
performers is more widely dispersed. Using the baseline unconditional model, the best and 
worst performing funds‟ residuals have standard deviations of 0.188 and 0.168 respectively, 
while the median fund‟s residuals have a much lower standard deviation of 0.016. This can be 
seen in Exhibits 9, 10 and 11. The histograms show that the residuals of the best and worst 
funds are widely dispersed compared to the median fund which is normally distributed and 
has lower variance. This high variance generates wide dispersion in the performance of funds 
at the top and bottom of the performance scale, with the bootstrapped alphas being reordered 
more frequently. 
 
It  could  be  argued  that  the  findings  presented  here  are  due  to  the  high  cross-sectional 
variation of alpha i.e. variable rather than simply poor management performance per se. An 
alternative version of this methodology, which does not reorder the bootstrapped alphas but 
instead  creates  the  distribution  of  luck  for  each  individual  fund,  should  therefore  be 
considered.  This  method  was  used  by  Kosowski  et  al.  (2006)  to  study  US  mutual  fund 
performance. Overall, the results, which are displayed in Exhibit 12, show that the five funds    
 
 
that had positive ex-post alpha were found to demonstrate genuine management skill, while 
the  remaining  75  funds  destroyed  value.  Using  this  alternative  assessment,  therefore,  the 
findings are similar to using alpha in its traditional form. However, the results do highlight 
the importance of the central methodology expounded here: capturing idiosyncratic risk is 
critical  to  a  proper  assessment  of  management  performance.  Variable  performance  is 
potentially poor performance and of central concern to investors. Re-running history for a 
single fund ignores the other possible distributions of luck encountered by other funds but 
these  other  luck  distributions  provide  valuable  information.  To  ignore  this  would  be  to 
assume that each fund operates in an independent environment, impacted by unique factors 
that do not affect other funds. The wide and over-lapping dispersion of fund performance 
disabuses us of such a notion. Luck, of course, doesn‟t discriminate. It is random and affects 
all funds, albeit in different ways, at different times.  
 
As noted earlier in the paper, some of the earlier studies of REMF performance, particularly 
those examining data prior to 2001, provide evidence of management out-performance. In 
addition, the REIT market has been through quite distinct phases in terms of its performance 
over the last two decades. Firstly, the recent poor performance of the REIT sector could 
influence the overall findings. Secondly, the late nineties were also characterised by relatively 
poor REIT sector performance. However, subsequent to the 2000 tech crash, REITs were one 
of the best performing US equity sectors. Furthermore, this post 2000 period also saw a large 
increase in trading volume in the sector and continued maturity of the sector. Therefore, in 
order to examine whether the results are time-varying and as an additional test of robustness, 
we examine REMF performance over two sub-periods. We consider two periods of January 
1995  to  March  2000  and  from  there  until  December  2006.  For  the  27  funds  that  had  a 
minimum of 15 observations in each sub-period, the bootstrap methodology was performed 
using the baseline unconditional model for both sub-periods. The results are presented in 
Exhibit 13. Overall, in Period 1, one fund demonstrated genuine skill in out-performance 
while all others genuinely destroyed value. In Period 2, all 27 funds demonstrated genuine 
negative alpha. This indicates that not only are the overall findings are not unduly biased by 
factors such as the performance of the sector in recent years, but that on a more general level, 
the results are largely invariant to the time-period studied. The fact that the results are similar 
in quite differing market conditions does provide additional weight to the empirical results 
reported. 
    
 
 
6: Conclusion and Implications 
The parametric bootstrap methodology presented here finds that none of the 80 REMFs, over 
a long sample period, exhibit stock selection skill. It is important to note that the methodology 
used  does  not  consider performance  per se.  Rather it  considers  whether  the  performance 
achieved,  whether  it  be  good,  bad  or  indifferent,  can  be  attributed  to  skill  or  luck.  The 
empirical findings show that even apparently successful funds ex-post display „poor‟ skill in 
that they perform significantly worse than they would be expected to simply due to luck. In 
addition, it is found that poor REMF performance is invariant to the time period or market 
conditions assessed. Even pre-2000, when the REIT market was less mature and less heavily 
traded,  REMF  managers demonstrate poor  skill.  It should  be  noted that these  results  are 
quantitatively different to previous studies of non-real estate mutual funds that use a similar 
bootstrap  methodology,  which  find  some  genuine  out-performers  and  under-performers, 
though not necessarily those at the top or bottom of ex-post performance (Cuthbertson et al, 
2008). The parametric bootstrap methodology implemented in this study is an alternative to 
traditional  alpha  in that  it  distinguishes  between  skill  and  luck.  It  also  offers  a  sensitive 
treatment of idiosyncratic risk, which it has been demonstrated is especially significant for the 
extreme performers investors are primarily interested in. It accounts for the luck experienced 
by all funds and in doing so offers an inbuilt test of the persistence of skill versus luck.  
 
The fact that our findings do not indicate substantive outperformance warrants consideration 
as to what factors could be influencing and impacting upon the performance of REIT Mutual 
Funds. In practical terms REMF Managers have a number of constraints that can limit their 
ability to outperform the benchmark. These constraints may mean that not only are less likely 
to be observed outperforming, but that their performance can be attributed to so called poor 
skill rather than luck. To begin with it is also possible that REIT Mutual Fund managers are 
constrained by internal asset allocation policies. It is quite common to see fund managers 
having to operate under allocation constraints that effectively limit their ability to partake in 
substantial degrees of active management. However, this would not alone explain the results 
obtained. A key element that could explain not only our findings but also those reported in 
Hartzell et al. (2010) is the size of the REIT sector. The REIT market is characterised by a 
relatively small number of large cap firms and a large number of small to mid-cap REITs. 
This can be seen in that in November 2008 the average market capitalization of Equity REITs 
was $1.3bn and that 60% of firms had a market cap below $1bn, which would classify them 
as small stocks. Even prior to the downturn in the market at the end of 2006 the average 
figure stood at $2.9bn and more than a third (36%) had market caps of less than a billion. This 
structural issue also impacts the benchmarks. The fact that the primary REIT benchmarks are 
value-weighted means that a small number of large firms, such as Boston Properties, Simon    
 
 
Property Group and Vornado, will act as the primary driving forces of the indices. Whilst 
Hartzell et al. (2010) finds that tilting their portfolios into small cap REITs can lead to REMF 
outperformance the practicalities of investment in the sector will impose constraints on a 
fund‟s ability to do so. The smaller firms will naturally display reduced liquidity and be less 
heavily  traded.  This  alone  would  limit  a  manager‟s  ability  to  wholeheartedly  shift  the 
portfolio out of the relatively small number of large cap REITs.  
 
However, the impact of the structure of the sector could possibly come through in other 
respects  as  well,  and  in  particular  the  contrast  in  recent  studies  of  REMF  performance. 
Whereas recent studies have largely found a lack of evidence pointing to outperformance, 
earlier studies often did find empirical evidence of fund outperformance. As noted earlier in 
this paper, and by Hartzell et al. (2010) and Ling & Naranjo (2006), not only has the REIT 
sector grown substantially since the early nineties, but so did the REIT Mutual Fund sector. 
The increased flow of funds into the sector, particularly in the 2000 to 2006 period could have 
had a number of implications. Firstly, it may actually have had a constraining effect on strong 
performing REMFs as the placement of such funds would be limited by the structure of the 
sector. Effectively, less capital may have been able to be directed towards smaller REITs due 
to  lower  market  capitalization  and  reduced  liquidity.  Secondly,  the  constraints  in  fully 
exploiting performance in small cap REITs may also help to explain the results reported by 
Hartzell et al. (2010) and Derwell et al. (2009) with respect to momentum profits. Again, 
managers may have been less able to exploit such momentum profits in the small-cap REIT 
sector due to a combination of the large scale flow of funds entering the REMF sector and the 
reduced liquidity in small cap REITs.  
 
Finally,  the  amount  of  funds  entering  the  sector  may  have  contributed  to  the  observed 
worsening performance. Barras et al. (2010) find a combination of an increasing numbers of 
fund and worsening performance since the early nineties in relation to the general mutual 
fund  sector.  The  hypotheses  proposed  relating  to  the  worsening  performance  include; 
increased  stock  market  efficiency,  the  increased  number  of  funds  leading  to  a  higher 
proportion of poorer managers and the impact of increased search costs for outperforming 
funds. The implications could be that the increased flow of funds into REMFs led to that 
capital not being solely directed towards strong performing managers but spread more evenly.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Exhibit 1: Cross-Sectional Results of Examined Models 
Notes: Exhibit 1 displays the cross-sectional results for different benchmarks for the  unconditional 
performance models. Panels B and C display the cross-sectional results for the conditional models 
solely using the Wilshire REIT Index. The results for the alternative benchmarks can be obtained from 




2  SIC 
Panel A: Unconditional       
Wilshire REIT  0.71  0.71  -4.534 
NAREIT REIT  0.70  0.69  -4.431 
NAREIT Listed  0.71  0.71  -4.508 
S&P500  0.17  0.15  -3.115 
F&F* (Wilshire)  0.73  0.71  -4.459 
Wilshire & Timing  0.72  0.71  -4.500 
F&F (Wilshire) & Timing  0.73  0.71  -4.422 
Panel B: Conditional Beta       
Conditional Wilshire  0.72  0.71  -4.480 
Conditional Wilshire & Timing  0.72  0.71  -4.445 
Conditional Wilshire & Conditional Timing  0.73  0.71  -4.396 
Conditional F&F  0.74  0.71  -4.304 
Conditional F&F & Timing  0.75  0.71  -4.266 
Conditional F&F & Conditional Timing  0.75  0.71  -4.241 
Panel C: Conditional Alpha Beta       
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional Wilshire  0.72  0.71  -4.428 
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional Wilshire & Timing  0.73  0.71  -4.392 
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional Wilshire & Conditional Timing  0.74  0.71  -4.353 
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional F&F  0.75  0.71  -4.265 
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional F&F & Timing  0.75  0.71  -4.226 
Conditional Alpha;  Conditional F&F & Conditional Timing  0.76  0.71  -4.118    
 
 
Exhibit 2: Cross-Sectional Results of Best Models 










Standard Deviation of Alpha  0.00384  0.00396  0.00689 
Number Positive / Negative Alphas  5 / 75  7 / 73  9 / 71 
Unconditional Beta       






Conditional Beta Variable       




Model Selection Criteria       
Adjusted R
2  0.71  0.71  0.70 
SIC  -4.553  -4.480  -4.428 
Residuals not normally distributed (% of funds)  86  84  89 
Equally-Weighted Portfolio       






Notes: Exhibit 2 displays the cross-sectional results for those models determined to be the best-fitting 
specifications. P-values are displayed in parentheses. 
    
 
 
Exhibit 3: Ex-Post Alphas 
Fund Name  Unconditional  Conditional Beta  Conditional Alpha-Beta  Fund Name  Unconditional  Conditional Beta  Conditional Alpha-Beta 
Fund 1  -0.011  -0.010  -0.010  Fund 41  -0.008  -0.008  -0.011 
Fund 2  0.003  0.003  0.003  Fund 42  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
Fund 3  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  Fund 43  -0.007  -0.006  -0.004 
Fund 4  -0.007  -0.007  -0.005  Fund 44  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008 
Fund 5  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  Fund 45  -0.016  -0.016  -0.018 
Fund 6  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  Fund 46  -0.016  -0.020  -0.001 
Fund 7  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  Fund 47  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
Fund 8  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  Fund 48  -0.005  -0.004  -0.024 
Fund 9  -0.010  -0.010  -0.011  Fund 49  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
Fund 10  -0.010  -0.010  -0.016  Fund 50  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
Fund 11  -0.002  -0.002  0.001  Fund 51  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
Fund 12  0.002  0.002  0.002  Fund 52  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007 
Fund 13  -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  Fund 53  -0.008  -0.008  -0.007 
Fund 14  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  Fund 54  -0.005  -0.005  -0.007 
Fund 15  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  Fund 55  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
Fund 16  -0.005  -0.005  0.001  Fund 56  0.001  0.001  0.006 
Fund 17  -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  Fund 57  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
Fund 18  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  Fund 58  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
Fund 19  -0.007  -0.007  -0.009  Fund 59  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004 
Fund 20  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015  Fund 60  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009 
Fund 21  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  Fund 61  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004 
Fund 22  -0.015  -0.015  -0.023  Fund 62  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006 
Fund 23  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  Fund 63  -0.010  -0.010  -0.007 
Fund 24  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  Fund 64  -0.007  -0.007  -0.004 
Fund 25  -0.014  -0.014  -0.018  Fund 65  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005 
Fund 26  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  Fund 66  -0.005  -0.005  -0.001 
Fund 27  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  Fund 67  -0.003  -0.003  -0.007 
Fund 28  -0.004  -0.004  0.000  Fund 68  -0.004  -0.003  0.006 
Fund 29  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  Fund 69  0.010  0.010  0.010 
Fund 30  -0.005  -0.005  -0.007  Fund 70  -0.011  -0.011  -0.010 
Fund 31  -0.004  -0.004  -0.006  Fund 71  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006 
Fund 32  -0.009  -0.010  -0.012  Fund 72  -0.003  -0.004  -0.005 
Fund 33  -0.007  -0.008  0.000  Fund 73  0.000  0.000  -0.001 
Fund 34  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  Fund 74  0.001  0.001  0.000 
Fund 35  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  Fund 75  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
Fund 36  0.000  0.001  0.000  Fund 76  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007 
Fund 37  -0.007  -0.005  -0.008  Fund 77  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
Fund 38  -0.005  -0.006  -0.004  Fund 78  -0.025  -0.019  -0.025 
Fund 39  -0.005  -0.005  -0.002  Fund 79  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
Fund 40  -0.019  -0.019  -0.039  Fund 80  -0.002  -0.002  0.000 
Mean  -0.0055  -0.0054  -0.0057  EW Portfolio  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
Notes: Exhibit 3 reports the ex-post alphas for each fund, estimated using the best-fitting models in each category.     
 
 
Exhibit 4: Cross-Sectional Alpha – Unconditional Model 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Cross-Sectional Alpha – Conditional Beta Model 
 
 
Exhibit 6: Cross-Sectional Alpha – Conditional Alpha Beta Model 
 
Notes: Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 display histograms of the distribution of the ex-post alpha‟s displayed in 
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Exhibit 7: Bootstrap Results of REMF Performance 
Panel A: Unconditional Model 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0251  -0.0158  -0.0110  -0.0092  -0.0049  -0.0022  -0.0006  0.0009  0.0099 
P-value  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 


















Panel B: Conditional Beta Model 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0196  -0.0158  -0.0107  -0.0093  -0.0049  -0.0018  -0.0004  0.0012  0.0097 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00 


















Panel C: Conditional Alpha-Beta Model 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0395  -0.0178  -0.0117  -0.0094  -0.0046  -0.0010  0.0003  0.0028  0.0098 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00 


















Notes: Exhibit 7 presents the summary bootstrap results for each class of performance model.  
 
    
 
 
























Notes: Exhibit 8 displays the location of the best performing fund using the unconditional model within its luck 
distribution.  
    
 
 
Exhibit 9: Residuals of Best Performing Fund 
 
 
Exhibit 10: Residuals of Worst Performing Fund  
 
 
Exhibit 11: Residuals of Median Performing Fund  
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Exhibit 12: Bootstrap Results of REMF Performance using Kosowski et al. Method 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0251  -0.0158  -0.0110  -0.0092  -0.0049  -0.0022  -0.0006  0.0009  0.0099 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 


















Notes: Exhibit 12 presents the summary bootstrap results for the unconditional model using the Kosowski  et al. 
(2006) methodology, which estimates the distribution of luck for each individual fund.  
    
 
 
Exhibit 13: Bootstrap Results of REMF Performance by Sub-period 
Panel A: January 1995-March 2000 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0076  -0.0075  -0.0037  -0.0030  -0.0017  0.0004  0.0016  0.0042  0.0164 
P-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0009 


















Panel B: April 2000-December 2006 
  Min  5%  10%  20%  Median  20%  10%  5%  Max 
Ex-post Alpha  -0.0180  -0.0139  -0.0103  -0.0031  -0.0018  0.0010  0.0024  0.0049  0.0083 
P-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 


















Notes: Exhibit 13 presents the summary bootstrap results for two sub-periods. 




Exhibit 1A: Descriptive Statistics for the 80 REMFs and Benchmarks 
  Months Traded  Mean Return  St. Dev.  Sharpe Ratio 
Panel A: Fund Results         
Fund 1  87  0.45  6.65  0.07 
Fund 2  24  1.74  3.06  0.57 
Fund 3  77  0.91  5.13  0.18 
Fund 4  46  0.75  6.15  0.12 
Fund 5  87  1.01  4.34  0.23 
Fund 6  158  0.96  6.09  0.16 
Fund 7  47  0.70  4.87  0.14 
Fund 8  81  0.80  5.52  0.15 
Fund 9  99  0.65  6.21  0.11 
Fund 10  102  0.07  6.61  0.01 
Fund 11  30  0.76  3.29  0.23 
Fund 12  160  1.28  5.91  0.22 
Fund 13  95  0.86  4.97  0.17 
Fund 14  160  0.89  4.67  0.19 
Fund 15  160  0.62  5.18  0.12 
Fund 16  51  0.46  3.98  0.12 
Fund 17  58  0.16  3.80  0.04 
Fund 18  160  0.87  4.37  0.20 
Fund 19  138  0.51  5.58  0.09 
Fund 20  57  0.05  7.47  0.01 
Fund 21  160  1.05  4.23  0.25 
Fund 22  40  -0.43  7.07  -0.06 
Fund 23  94  0.98  4.88  0.20 
Fund 24  23  0.37  6.22  0.06 
Fund 25  113  0.05  7.90  0.01 
Fund 26  123  0.58  4.13  0.14 
Fund 27  67  1.22  4.74  0.26 
Fund 28  62  0.19  1.77  0.11 
Fund 29  134  0.78  4.59  0.17 
Fund 30  141  0.64  4.66  0.14 
Fund 31  111  0.94  4.97  0.19 
Fund 32  135  0.15  5.60  0.03 
Fund 33  16  -1.12  7.49  -0.15 
Fund 34  128  0.77  4.70  0.16 
Fund 35  27  0.16  6.08  0.03 
Fund 36  15  -1.15  6.32  -0.18 
Fund 37  26  0.17  2.75  0.06 
Fund 38  81  0.28  4.16  0.07 
Fund 39  52  0.86  5.36  0.16 
Fund 40  30  -0.59  10.50  -0.06 
Fund 41  110  0.56  6.30  0.09 
Fund 42  122  0.83  4.77  0.17 
Fund 43  63  1.01  5.25  0.19 
Fund 44  95  0.60  4.89  0.12 
Fund 45  39  -0.17  8.01  -0.02 
Fund 46  16  -1.50  7.30  -0.21 
Fund 47  27  1.77  4.40  0.40 
Fund 48  21  0.55  3.57  0.15 
Fund 49  21  1.11  4.68  0.24 
Fund 50  88  0.73  5.20  0.14 
Fund 51  155  0.39  6.94  0.06 
Fund 52  135  0.50  4.86  0.10 
Fund 53  71  0.54  5.87  0.09 
Fund 54  154  0.27  7.38  0.04 
Fund 55  54  1.23  5.36  0.23 
Fund 56  19  0.26  5.92  0.04 
Fund 57  104  1.27  4.43  0.29 
Fund 58  160  0.91  4.48  0.20 
Fund 59  40  0.69  5.33  0.13 
Fund 60  34  0.07  6.14  0.01 
Fund 61  104  1.18  6.15  0.19    
 
 
Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics for the 80 REMFs and Benchmarks (Continued) 
Fund 62  93  1.12  6.45  0.17 
Fund 63  59  0.15  4.72  0.03 
Fund 64  38  0.57  6.03  0.09 
Fund 65  127  0.66  4.83  0.14 
Fund 66  34  0.43  4.85  0.09 
Fund 67  52  0.19  4.37  0.04 
Fund 68  22  -0.10  3.82  -0.03 
Fund 69  86  2.40  19.34  0.12 
Fund 70  55  0.32  6.14  0.05 
Fund 71  66  0.87  4.66  0.19 
Fund 72  119  0.81  4.93  0.16 
Fund 73  122  1.00  4.36  0.23 
Fund 74  99  1.13  3.65  0.31 
Fund 75  34  0.76  5.14  -0.02 
Fund 76  67  0.73  5.37  0.14 
Fund 77  160  0.61  4.63  -1.77 
Fund 78  21  -2.91  16.94  -0.17 
Fund 79  82  0.77  3.61  0.21 
Fund 80  46  2.07  4.03  0.51 
Average Across Funds  82  0.56  5.59  0.10 
Panel B: Index Results         
EW Portfolio 80 REMFs  160  0.76  4.23  0.18 
S&P500  160  0.93  3.99  0.23 
NAREIT All REITs  160  1.11  4.02  0.28 
NAREIT US Listed R.E  160  1.26  4.18  0.30 
Wilshire All REITs  160  1.19  4.15  0.29 




                                                 
1 A recent paper by Barras et al. (2010) adopts a different approach in the examination of „luck‟. They 
consider the „False Discovery Rate‟ which effectively considers the proportion of funds classified as 
outperforming, in terms of a significant alpha, that can be deemed truly successful. A disadvantage 
with the Barras et al. (2010) approach is that is not possible to identify which specific funds are 
actually outperforming, merely the proportion. 
2 The investment style of the fund used in the Kosowski et al. (2006) paper is that specified in the 
fund‟s investment objective, rather than an empirically estimated definition using a technique such as 
Style Analysis. 
3 Our sample does differ from that used by Hartzell et al. (2010). We obtain our data from Thomson 
Reuters  Datastream  and  Morningstar,  whereas  Hartzell  et  al.  (2010)  use  the  CRSP  mutual  fund 
database. Furthermore, the restrictions we impose detailed in the text with respect to international 
investment and tracker funds may also lead to a reduction in our sample in comparison with Hartzell 
et al. (2010). The sample used in Derwell et al. (2009) is substantially higher than that utilized in 
either the Hartzell et al. (2010) paper or the current study at 282 funds. While both Hartzell et al. 
(2010) and our paper only consider unique funds the high number of funds utilized by Derwell et al. 
(2009) would suggest that they include replications of the same funds. 
4 Hartzell et al. (2010) differ in their approach in that they use real estate security specific factors, 
rather than the more general stock market variables commonly used and also utilised in the current 
study. 
5 Gallo et al‟s (2000) finding of sector-weighting impacting fund performance studied a time period 
when the REIT market was less homogenous. 
6 To some degree the fact that the standard single index model is selected is advantageous in the sense 
that this is the specification generally used and quoted by funds. 
7 The fact that our findings do not report any significant outperformance overcomes a possible bias 
noted by Fama & French (2009). They argue that in comparison to their bootstrapping approach, the 
failure to account for the joint distribution of fund and explanatory variable returns may produce a 
bias towards positive performance. 